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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round (UR) 1 revised the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 2 which was first
introduced in the Tokyo Round. 3 The revised TBT has been
applied to the GATT member countries since 1995. Article
2.2 of the TBT provides national product safety agencies
with requirements for risk assessment and risk management. 4
The terms used in the Article are broad and can have
various interpretations: minimum requirements, common
denominators of GATT member countries' practices for risk
assessment and risk management. The Article also allows
1
. The UR (1986-1994) had discussed especially such topics as
dispute settlement procedure and principles, agriculture,
intellectual properties, services, and so on. See Jonn H. Jackson,
Legal Problems of International Problems of International
Relations, at pp. 302-304 (forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter,
Jackson] ; on the text of agreements resulting from UR, see GATT,
The Results of the Urguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiation
(1994)
2
. The UR also introduced the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (ASPM) , which regulates the
sanitary and phytosanitary aspect of all kinds of food. ASPM is
the special agreement to the TBT.
3
.
The Tokyo Round (1973-79) was held in order to handle non-
tarriff barriers such as subsidies, dumpings, and the like; TBT
was born as one of the agreements in this line. Id. at pp. 3 04-
305.
4
. In ASPM, Article 5. Setting safety regulations and
standards is a dominant measure among risk management strategies.
2vast discretion for national practices in order to make
room for the differences in national practices.
However, vast discretion and broad terms cannot solve
technical barriers effectively. 5 The minimum requirements
have already been criticized for failing to consider those
countries whose technology in product safety is inferior to
that of developed countries. Moreover, the minimum
requirements can raise trade barriers in international
trade between developing countries and developed countries
.
Developed countries can protect their industries from
products competitive in price through technologically
strict standards; developing countries can require the
companies of the developed countries to reveal state-of-the
-art technology, the pivot of their international
competition. Therefore, the TBT should contain detailed
provisions in order to solve this problem.
The United States is one of the developed countries
with the strongest product safety measures, thanks to the
consumer protection movement and advanced technology. The
US has its own system of risk assessment and risk
management for product safety. Since these are activities
of a sovereign nation, they will not violate Article 2 . 2 of
TBT unless these regulations and standards are more trade-
restrictive than necessary to achieve safety legitimacy.
Some practices of the US product safety agencies have been
fi
. On technical barriers, see infra at pp. 57-61.
3criticized because they consider not internationally
accepted practices but their own industrial practices.
Moreover, some of their methods in risk assessment and risk
management are under attack for violating Article 2 . 2 of
the TBT. If the interpretation of the Article finds the US
practices in violation of the TBT, the US must change its
practices in accordance with the Article. In addition, when
the TBT adds detailed provisions, as I suggest that it
should, US practices should also make deep and broad
changes to comply with the new provisions.
This thesis will discuss the current problems of the
TBT and of US practices and suggest changes. For these
purposes, I will first discuss general theories on the
reasons why each country has different practices and
standards, the types of product safety regulations, and the
characteristics of product safety regulations and
standards. Then, an analysis of the US practices and
Article 2.2 of the TBT will follow. Finally, possible
changes will be suggested in order to address the problems.
CHAPTER II
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
A. Risk in Product Safety
A risk is "a notion of observation, and not just an
object to be observed." 6 It can be compared to "a kind of
lens through which we see the world." 7 Depending on notions
and methods of observation, the definition of a risk can
change. In one of the definitions, a risk means "potential
adverse events," 8 while safety means "freedom from danger,
injury or damage." 9 A risk in product safety, therefore, can
be defined as potential adverse events such as danger,
injury or damage from the use and storage of products. 10 A
6
. Franz Holzheu and Peter M. Wiedermann, Introduction:
Perspectives on Risk Perception in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at pp. 9-10 (1993)
.
7
. Id.
8
. A risk can have three different definitions. It generally
means "potential events whose concrete manifestation cannot be
foreseen with any certainty," but narrowly means "potential
adverse events" as seen above. Even more generally, it means
"unspecified aberrations from a normal or average trend whether
... in the adverse direction or in both directions including
favorable departures from a norm as well." Id. at 9.
9
. David B. Guralnik, Webster' s New World Dictionary 2nd Ed.
(1980) .
10
. This thesis will only deal with human injury. The
definition of an injury is a level of harm or concern about harm,
sufficient to result in activity cutdown for one day or more or
medical examination with or without activity cutdown. Irving
Scher, Consumer Product Safety Act, at p. 112 and 116
(1973) [hereinafter, Scher 1973]
.
5risk is a potential ^vent which is described in terms of
probability in comparison with other risks. 11
B. Risk Assessment and Risk Management
1. Facts and Values
Risk assessment is the process of determining the
probability and severity of an accident or a disease. It
considers facts, and its outcome is stated mostly in
statistics or comparison statements, 12 based on empirical or
scientific analysis. 13 The assessment may be based on an
assumption as well as facts. 14
Risk management, on the other hand, means control over
the identified risks. It deals with social values 15 and
seeks to evaluate selected measures, alternatives, effects
on society, costs and benefits and so on.
11
. Holzheu and Wiedermann, at p . 10.
12
. Lewis Bass, Product Liability: Design and Manufacturing
Defects, at p. 415 (1986) .
13
. OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, Consumer Product
Safety Standards and International Trade, at p. 19 (1991)
[hereinafter, OECD 1991] .
14
. Even though risk assessment deals with facts, the
assumption based on these facts also needs value judgment.
15
. Kathryn Harrison and George Hoberg, Risk, Science and
Politics, at p. 7 (1994) .
2. Characteristics
a. Risk Assessment: Technical and Scientific Uncertainty
Safety agencies have a tough task of determining
regulations based on uncertain data, which stems from the
attributes of science and technology. Data for risk
assessment always include technical and scientific facts
and assumptions such as ceteris paribus . 16 Since variable
factors can change the conclusion based on an assumption,
risk assessment and risk management decisions are based on
a high level of uncertainty. Health and safety agencies
must make value judgements regarding the probability of
harm and the degree of acceptable risk despite this
uncertainty. 17
b. Risk Management: Value Judgement
The safety regulation on product safety is one of the
social regulations that focus on social values. Safety is
one of the social values,- 18 risks are the opposite side of
16
. It means "all else remaining the same." See Guralnik, p.
234.
17
. Harrison and Hoberg, at p. 5; refer to organization
theory and sociology.
18
. The regulations can be classified into economic
regulations and social regulations based on the difference of the
weight between values and information. Social regulations concern
the living quality of national people, examples of which are the
protection of consumers of products and environmental health and
safety. See Peter K. Manning, The Limits of Knowledge : The Role of
7safety. The areas of risks are still too new to form a
reliable and coherent model for value judgments in making
regulations and standards. 19 The terms in product safety
provisions are usually so ambiguous and symbolic that their
operation is often challenged surrounding the
interpretation
.
20
3 . Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the Process of
Making Product Safety Regulations and Standards
The process of making product safety regulations and
standards comprises five stages: hazard identification,
risk characterization, the survey of overall measures and
their data, the decision of a measure and its details, and
implementation and feedback. 21 Risk assessment and risk
management cover the entire process of making safety
regulations or standards.
For example, suppose the risk assessment and the risk
management of carcinogens in a consumer product. Risk
assessment involves the first stages. The first stage is
hazard identification. Safety agencies try to find out
Information in Regulation in Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas ed
Making Regulatory Policy, at p. 49 and 51 (1989) [hereinafter,
Manning]
.
19
. W. Curtiss Priest, Risks, Concerns and Social
Legislation, at p. 167 (1988) [hereinafter, Priest]
.
20
. Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas, Making Regulatory
Policy, at p. 15 (1989)
.
21
. Id. at pp. 6-7.
8whether or not a certain substance causes cancer, the
hazard assessed from the number of incidents, severities of
injuries and so on. This information molds the assumption
that a certain product is dangerous to humans. However,
this identification process remains at a preliminary level.
Based on this preliminary assumption, the source and the
probability of potential harm will be assessed on the basis
of collected data as the risk characterization.
The second stage is risk characterization. Here, the
severity and the probability of cancer are estimated, based
on the carcinogenic potency of substances in the product as
well as the extent and the nature of human exposure to it.
At this stage, a preliminary decision is made regarding the
necessity for and priority of safety measures.
Risk management consists of three stages. In the first
stage, a survey of overall measures is made. The safety
agencies identify and compare as many safety measures and
alternatives as possible. Basic information is gathered on
cost, technical feasibility, impact on the society, and the
possibility of alternative measures. The next stage is
selecting a safety measure and determining its details.
Here, an acceptable level of risk and the measures to
achieve the best result are chosen. Such decisions are
founded on the information from the preceding stages . The
choice can be made based on intuition, political motives
and existing formal criteria such as cost-benefit analysis
9of the safety agencies, or the policy and philosophy of
certain influential participants. The final stage is
implementation and feedback. The chosen strategy is
reviewed and adjustments are made. This process helps
safety agencies assess correctly the efficiency of the
chosen measures and shift quickly to another strategy if
the results are not satisfactory.
C. Factors that Cause Different Practices among Countries
1. Examples of Differences
The practices of risk assessment and risk management
vary among countries and depend on how people in different
areas perceive risks: the greater the fear of risks in an
area, the stricter the safety requirements. For example,
the safety regulations of the US National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) have a notorious reputation
among developed countries in that the conformity with these
regulations requires technical enhancement. 22 Japan has more
fear about risks in food than any other country. 23 The US is
one of the countries which have the greatest fear about
technological products with unknown hazards. 24 These are
22
. OECD 1991, at p. 27; on the reasons for the notorious
reputation, see infra, Chapter V, B, 1 and 2.
23
. Aaron Wildavsky, Comparative Study of Risk Perception in
Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at p. 185 (1993)
.
24
. Id. at p. 190.
10
some examples of how different notions about risks result
in different risk assessment and risk management practices.
The quantitative differences in risk assessment and
risk management can be shown by the relative degree of
acceptability or appropriateness. For example, suppose
Country A determines product X hazardous if it causes more
than one casualty out of 100 consumers, whereas Country B
considers X hazardous if it causes one casualty out of 1000
customers. If no trade in product X exists between those
two countries, there will be no dispute over product safety
measures because the decision of acceptable risk is a right
of national sovereignty. However, the reality is that
countries do trade with each other.
2 . Basic Principles
Though different countries take different approaches
to risk assessment and risk management, they operate under
common principles. The first two principles stem from the
free market system, the first being that a zero risk of
products is not only almost impossible but also
inefficient, the second, that different consumers and
societies evaluate the safety of a product differently. 25
25
. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety, at p.
2 (1984) .
11
Third, risk management aimed toward manufacturers
prevails over risk management toward consumers. The safety-
agencies survey consumer behaviors and their influence on
the agencies' total safety regulation scheme. 26
Theoretically, they should take account of reasonably
foreseeable consumer behaviors and set the safety program
to change. However, in real practice safety regulations
usually concentrate on trying to change manufacturers
rather than consumers just because changing manufacturers'
practices is easier than changing consumers' behaviors. 27
Without any efforts to correct consumer behaviors, it is
doubtful that safety regulations will achieve the objective
of consumer safety. For example, despite the introduction
of a certain type of car seat belt, the accident rate might
not be reduced.
The fourth principle is that risk assessment and
management are a matter of degree and attitude. As
discussed earlier, "different kinds of lens" determine
things to be seen. 28 The lens is the society, time, and the
situation. For instance, the degree of risks in nuclear
power plant safety or traffic safety, is different
depending on the societies.
26
. Id. at p. 19.
27
. Id. at p. 20.
28
. Holzheu and Wiedemann, at pp. 9-10.
12
3
. Factors in Risk Assessment
a. Hegemony between Experts and Lay people
The hegemony within safety agencies between experts
and lay people may influence product safety regulations and
standards since lay people and experts view risk assessment
differently. 29 Experts regard probability and uncertainty as
very important elements. 30 They try to exploit all the
available data and perform fault -free analyses, prefer
mathematical calculations and consider uncertainty with a
high degree of exactness when calculating the probability
of occurrences. 31 They try to be free of the emotional
element in their jobs. These experts tend to underestimate
the risks of low- consequence but high-probability events. 32
On the contrary, lay people tend to overestimate the
risks of high- consequence but low-probability events. Lay
people base their risk perception on fear, familiarity, and
the number of people exposed to the risks. 33 They are not
familiar with the experts' methods for dealing with
probability and uncertainty. Therefore, depending on
29
. Lay people are people other than experts who specialize
in scientific or technological knowledge in a relevant area.
30
. Peter M. Wiedemann, Taboo, Sin, Risk: Changes in the
Social Perception of Hazards in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at p. 51 (1993)
.
31
. Ray Kemp, Risk Perception in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a
Construct, at pp. 105-106 (1993)
.
32
. Id. at p. 106.
33
. Id. at pp. 106-107.
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relative power of experts and lay people within the safety
agencies, the outcome of risk management will differ.
b. Methodology of Experts in Risk Assessment
The result of risk assessment in the process of making
product safety regulations and standards may depend on
which method is adopted among experts' methods. Moreover,
the degree of reliance on experts' reports can make safety
agencies' risk management different.
During the preliminary stage of hazard identification,
experts use more varied and specific methods of risk
assessment than do lay people. The lab test is one of them.
Products which "go into human" almost always go through lab
tests performed by toxicologists, food scientists, or
biochemists. 34 The toxic substance test, the bio-
organization test, and the like are conducted on animals
such as mice and rats. These tests may reveal such
information as the exact amount of a substance, the
tolerance of the human body, or the threshold of a disease.
Experts may take one of two approaches. In a
qualitative approach, research is focused on at how much
amount of intake a substance crosses the threshold to
unsafety. In a quantitative approach, any toxic substance
3
"
. On the meaning of products which go into human, see infra
Chapter III, A, 1.
14
is considered dangerous regardless of its amount. The
greater the consumption, the more dangerous it is
proclaimed to be to humans . In some countries where
scientific technology can calculate the effect of a minute
amount of a toxic substance, safety agencies have chosen
the quantitative assessment approach as their primary
method. When this quantitative approach is combined with
the theory of probability, the risk assessment process may
reveal the statistical chances of individuals' contracting
a disease in proportion to the increasing consumption of
the substance. 35
The lab tests have limitations. Thirty-four substances
out of thirty- five extrinsic substances known to cause
cancer in people generate the same results in animals, but
the site of the cancer can be different. Moreover, the
extrapolation of animal tests to humans is still a
controversial issue because a substance which does not
cause cancer in animals can, in rare cases, cause cancer in
humans, as in the case of the Thalidomide disaster. 36 Some
also criticized that the heavy-dose tests on a small number
of animals may undermine the credibility of animal tests
when the test results are extrapolated to humans.
35
. Harrison and Hoberg, at p. 5.
36
. New York University Medical Center, Staying Healthy in a
Risky Environment, at p. 231 (1993); Linda Cummings, The Political
Reality of Artificial Sweeteners in Harvey M. Sapolsky ed.
Consuming Fear, at p . 121 (19 86)
.
15
Another method is the epidemiological study, in which
the responses of the real population are researched on the
products
.
This requires a great deal of data gathered from
a large number of people over a long time. The problem here
is that all the possible variables cannot be considered and
that the results may vary depending on the individuals. 37
c. The Progress of Science and Technology
Scientific and technological development may affect
consumer attitudes toward the notion of safety. One of
these changes is the reduction of a fatalistic attitude
toward risks. 38 This change becomes complicated when
combined with other changes: the increased feeling of
insecurity which results from increased reliance on other
people; 39 reduction of direct experience; 40 a less
predictable future; bulky mass media information; the
37
. Cummings, at p . 121.
38
. A concrete example is the way perceptions regarding
bearing children and delivery have changed. We can see how fast
mothers' views on the death or disability of a newborn have
changed into suspecting medical or scientific incompetence from
the earlier fatalistic viewpoint. See, Liibbe at pp. 26-28.
39
.
Modernization means more reliance on other's action and
warranty. This reliance means a situation seems out of one's own
control. The risk perceived of public transportation, for example,
is higher than that of one's own transportation. See, id. at pp.
28-30.
40
. As basic knowledge of technical and scientific matters
has become more difficult for a lay person, the experience of
specialists or experts has started filling the gap. However, as in
hearings on certain regulations, these specialists sometimes have
opinions divided enough to disturb lay people's confidence. See,
id. at pp. 30-32 .
16
decline of social control, and a high anticipation of
technological social security. 41 In addition, uneven
scientific development among different countries produces
different practices of risk assessment and risk
management
.
42
Progress in science and technology produces a feeling
of uncertainty about the future more frequently now than
ever. This uncertainty has led safety agencies to make
stricter regulations. For example, as detection methods for
food safety have improved, certain foods or food additives
that have long been regarded as relatively safe are being
challenged as unsafe. The more revelations are made, the
more people feel unsafe. 43
This technological and scientific uncertainty also
causes regulatory uncertainty in companies. 44 For example,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) required
industries to use a flame -retardant textile, Tris . However,
when it was discovered to contain a carcinogen, it was
banned. The companies that invested to comply with the CPSC
requirement incurred massive losses.
41
. For example, the expectations for newly developed
medicine have increased. See id. at pp. 36-37.
42
. Hermann Liibbe, Security, Risk Perception in the
Civilization Process in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at
p. 26 (1993)
.
43
.
Cummings, at p. 119; this panic culminated in the zero
risk policy on the carcinogenicity of food additives in FDCA's
Delaney Amendment.
44
. Viscusi, at p. 68.
17
4. Factors in Risk Management
a. Different Cultures
The product safety agencies in different countries
respond differently to the same risk assessment results.
One of the reasons is that their national cultures
influence their responses. 45
In anthropology societies can be classified into
hierarchical cultures, egalitarian cultures,
individualistic cultures, and fatalistic cultures. 46 Risk
management is different in each culture. A hierarchial
culture follows the rejection or absorption of risks by its
decision makers,- an egalitarian culture rejects or deflects
risks without harming the principle of equality; an
individualistic culture accepts or deflects risks in
accordance with the consensus among individuals; and a
fatalistic culture accepts and absorbs risks without any
reservation. Though these cultures can coexist within a
country, the most prevalent culture will represent the
culture of the country when defining the characteristic of
a country.
45
. Harry Otway and Malcolm Peltu, Regulating Industrial
Risks, at p. 4 (1985) .
46
. On details, see Wildvsky, at pp. 185-187.
18
b. Lay People and Experts
A different level of acceptable risk depends on
whether lay people or the experts are dominant in the
decision making process within safety agencies. According
to Juregan Habermas, experts are theoretical and empirical,
while lay people are practical and norms or value-
oriented. 47 Lay people try to find tolerable risks and focus
on evaluation, while experts try to find quantifiable risks
and statements of facts. Lay people regard appropriateness
as the standard of judgment, whereas truth is the scale for
the experts. The lay people in an agency try to justify the
motives behind safety, while the experts try to explain the
causes of accidents or phenomena.
c. Risk Communication
Risk communication refers to activities among safety
agencies, industries, and citizens through the media
concerning risks. In a democratic country, it aims to help
the participants in risk assessment and risk management to
make rational decisions based on unrestricted information. 48
The extent and frequency of risk communication
determine what is feared and how much it is feared, and
47
. Kemp, at p. 115.
48
. G. Tyler Miller, Living in the Environment: Principles,
Connections, and Solution, at pp. 544-549 (1994) .
19
this varies among the countries. 49 For example, the
countries of former Eastern Europe were ignorant of the
risks of new substances made by new technology, because
they restricted risk communication believing that technical
progress equaled social progress. 50 Distortion of the risk
communication process induces false information or no
information, while a guarantee of participation and
discussion as well as availability of the mass media
enhances risk management. 51
d. Attitude toward Science
The attitude toward science is also very important.
The degree of acceptability of scientific evidence and its
role were disputed in the ban case on the use of hormonal
substances in livestocks in 1987. The European Community
(EC) Directive on this measure was to go into effect
beginning January 1 of 1988. The US argued that hormones at
a certain level were safe according to their scientific
evidence and that the EC's regulations were not necessary.
The EC contested the Production and Process Methods (PPMs)
,
expressing doubt about the scientific findings because they
found miscalculations of certain chemical products. In the
49
. On an example, see Wildavsky, at p. 190.
50
. Gerhard Hummius and Jens Kliemt, Risk as a Social
Construction in Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at p. 222
(1993) .
51
. Kemp, at pp. 114-116.
20
dispute resolution procedure, the US insisted on the
establishment of an expert group, whereas the EC insisted
on setting up a panel without the expert group. This case
shows the differences between two parties on the role of
science and technology and expert assistance in dispute
settlement procedures. 52
e. Participation
Participation by consumers, companies or foreign
companies with less developed technology changes the
results of the standards and regulations. For example,
restricting participation to industry members that have
already attained a certain level of technology allows those
members to be able to discourage other lower-price
competetors . They may try to avert the new technology of
foreign companies. 53 Those members may ask safety agencies
or private standard makers to reflect only their own
manufacturing practices and technical feasibility. This
situation happens when safety agencies rely solely on the
expert knowledge of manufacturers. 54
52
. GATT, GATT Activities 1987, at p. 80 (1988) [hereinafter,
GATT 1987] . On the international dispute on the safety measure,
see id. at p. 100.
53
. Franz Holzheu, Institutionalized Risk Perception in
Bayerishe Ruck ed. Risk is a Construct, at pp. 262-263 (1993).
54
. In reality, limited participation is prevalent in some
countries or safety agencies
.
21
Consumer participation in risk management has a very
important meaning in that it can check the industry's
intention to drive out competitors who offer overall good
quality at a reasonable price. Theoretically, consumers'
taste worldwide is becoming more homogenous as product
information flows quickly throughout the world. 55 Consumer
participation, therefore, may reflect an international view
on the quality of products. However, the degree and effect
of participation is different among the countries. 56
Moreover, unless foreign companies are allowed to
participate in the entire process of making safety
regulations and standards, the standards or regulations
will inevitably reflect the national culture and
practices . 57
D. Styles of Risk Management
1. Focus on Consensus
As discussed above, the styles of risk assessment and
risk management among countries vary depending on many
factors. First, the adversary structure universal in
55
. Michael R. Czinkota and Ilkka A. Ronkainen, International
Marketing, at p. 269-273 (1995) .
56
. See Chapter III, A, 3, b.
57
. Hans van Houtte, Health and Safety Regulations in
International Trade in Peter Sarcevic and Hans van Houtte ed.
Legal Issues in International Law, at p. 128 (1990), note 2.
22
typical democratic countries such as the US, is
characterized by free information, free lobbying, and
multi-polar authority. Its regulatory process is
essentially adversarial among influential participants. 58
Under the adversarial system, the method of how and in
favor of which participant decision makers interpret the
external limits influences both the efficiency and the
equity of the risk management. The second style, called the
consensual structure, can be seen in the UK or the
Scandinavian countries. It has such characteristics as
deference to decisions made by elite groups which include
experts, the industries and the unions.
The third style is the authoritative style, as in the
French system. It encourages the autonomy of the
technicians of the central government. Another structure is
the corporate style, as in Germany. This style is less
democratic than the adversary structure but decentralizes
the government authorities into many participants. However,
to assure coherence of policies, it has a multi-layer
surveillance program and various participation programs. 59
The above four styles are prototypes . The
characteristics of these structures may be combined in
various ways. The US has a more typically adversary
structure than any other country. It pays more attention to
58
. Hawkins and Thomas, at p . 4
59
. Otway and Peltu, at p. 5.
23
due process, one of the democratic principles, to solve
adversarial clashes among participants
.
2. Focus on Decision Makers
There are four types of decision makers in risk
management, according to the OECD report. The first is the
vertical model, where the central government has safety
regulation authority and disperses it through the regional
or branch governments by means of a command. It is
generally common in the developing countries. The second
one is the centralized model, in which, despite the
existence of private standard makers, the regulatory
activities are entirely dependent on governmental control
and a relation between two sectors exists. Germany, Japan,
and France follow this model . The third model is the
decentralized model. Here, governmental influence is
significantly diminished. Many private standard makers are
organized and actively participate in the regulatory
process . Canada and some parts of the US have this model
.
The fourth one is the horizontal standardization model that
can be seen in the US. In this model regulatory authority
is dispersed throughout influential groups and other
decision makers. This is such a democratic process that
24
cooperation among the participants and the standard makers
is weaker than in the third model. 60
3 . Focus on Relation between Standards and Regulations
The relations between standards and regulations can be
classified into four types. The first type is the
establishment of safety specifications through regulation
by the safety agencies. 61 The safety agencies incorporate
already existent voluntary safety standards into mandatary
standards in regulations or develop specific mandatory
safety standards in regulations for themselves. 62 The
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) , for example,
sometimes incorporated certain privately developed
standards into regulations after amendment of the Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA) in 1980.
The second type is the establishment of standards by
independent standardization bodies, private or governmental
entities. There is no legal relation between those entities
and safety agencies. However, mandatory standards created
by safety agencies occasionally refer to specific safety
standards of these bodies. The Deutsches Institut fur
Normung (DIN) in Germany and the American National
60
. OECD 1991, at pp. 24-25.
61
. Hereinafter, the safety specification means the mandatory
safety standards within regulations.
62
. OECD 1991, at pp. 25-27.
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Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of
Testing and Materials (ASTM) in the US are examples of
these independent standardization entities.
The third type makes reference to standards in
regulations. This style is prevalent in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France. There is an agreement on the reference
between the safety agencies and the private standard
makers. The safety agencies prescribe as general provisions
as possible, and they support and finance activities by the
private standard makers . The standards are then mandatorily
enforced. This can also be seen in the US system. 63
The fourth is the voluntary approach, which
concentrates on private standard makers' self -regulation.
Regulators and standard makers are separated and are
independent from each other. There is no relation with
safety agencies, no reference to standards by regulations
and no monitoring system. This is true, for example, in
Sweden and Australia. 64
The US originally used a mixture of the first type,
the second type and third types. After the product safety
agencies' vigorous attempts to use the first type were
frustrated, the second and the third types are now
prevalent
.
65
". Id. at pp. 31-32.
64
. Id. at p. 33.
. See infra Chapter III, B, 2.
CHAPTER III
US PRACTICES ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR
PRODUCT SAFETY
A. Practices in Safety Regulations on Products
1. From FDCA to CPSA
The US history of safety regulations on consumer
products may be divided into the three stages: food and
drug legislation (1906-1953) ; legislation directed at
specific hazards (1953-1972) ; and the birth of
comprehensive laws like the CPSA. 66 In the first stage, the
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) of 1938 concentrated
on the following: for the regulations that created
standards of identity and for the labeling of products; the
burden of proof of product safety; and supervision over
manufacturing practices. 67 In the second stage, many laws
and regulations targeted specific kinds of products or
66
. Michael R. Lemov, Product Safety Commission, at 1.01
(1983) .
67
. Id. at 1.02. The burden of proof lies on manufacturers
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issues: flammable fabrics, 68 products containing hazardous
substances like chemicals, 69 children's items, 70 car
accidents, 71 suffocation in refrigerators, 72 the control of
radiation from electronic products 73 and poisonous
products . 74
In the third stage, product safety has been regulated
under the CPSA, a general legislation, although some
products are still under other laws and regulations. 75
Tobacco is regulated under the FHSA and the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act; motor vehicles, under the
NTMVSA; pesticides, under the FIFRA; aircraft and related
products, under the FAA; boats and vessels, under the
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) ; food, drugs, and
cosmetics, under the FDCA; products related to the work
place and working condition, under the Occupational Safety
68
. Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953 (FFA) . It was amended in
1967 to include whole fabrics and give authority to the Secretary
of Commerce to set standards for f lammability. See Lemov at 1.04.
FTC can ban fabrics worse than standard. See Lemov at 1.05.
69
. Federal Hazardous Substances Act of 1960 (FHSA), Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1959 (FIFRA) , FDCA,
and Federal Caustic Posison Act of 1927 (FCPA) . See Lemov at 1.05.
FHSA was amended to give the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) the power to ban household goods and toys containing
certain chemical substances.
70
. Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969 (CPTSA) . See
Lemov at 1.05. It gives the HEW the power to recall or remove
banned substance from children's goods.
71
. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA) . It introduces a special agency called the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
72
. Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956 (RSA)
73
. Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968
(RCHSA)
74
. Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 (PPPA)
75
. Lemov, at 4.05, 4.07 note 2 and 3 and 4.08.
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and Health Act (OHSA) ; radioactive products, under the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) ; and radiation from electronic
products, under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)
.
76
Among the numerous laws and regulations that have been
introduced since the first stage, the CPSA is still a
typical comprehensive regulation scheme, and therefore, the
analysis of the CPSA can be analogous to that of other
special legislation. Meanwhile, the FDCA is not
comprehensive but can be regarded as a general regulatory-
scheme on food, drugs and cosmetics, categories that are
very broad in kinds and make up a great portion of the
consumer market. 77 Therefore, the analysis of these
products will also be worthwhile in understanding similar
styles of legislation in the US. In this section of the
thesis, the practices of the CPSA and FDCA will be
discussed in reference to the aforementioned five stages.
76
. CPSA Section 31.
77
. Howard Abbott, Product Liability, at pp. 23-24 (1978); The
amount of consideration concerning safety is different depending
on products and can broadly be divided into two groups of
products, "products which go into" human and "products which go
onto" human. The former, such as food, cosmetics and drugs, need
"a full scale safety program" because they directly affect the
human body inside, whereas the latter, such as household products,
household appliances, and so-called consumer products do not. The
latter group has exception. Transportation vehicles have a strict
safety program. As a further example, Abbott enumerates
comparisons between meat and an aftershave lotion and shows how
biologically active face cream has more risk than a cream cracker.
Within the same group, the degree of risk varies depending on the
inheritant attribute of products and human activities; for
example, an electric carpentry machine is more dangerous than an
electric cleaning machine.
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2 . Risk Assessment Stage
Hazard identification can be achieved by research
before or after the sale of products. 78 Pre- sale research
consists of lab experiments and tests on a sample
population. The lab experiments test contaminants or
additives of the products, e.g., residual pesticides on
agricultural products and additives in food. Post -sale
research collects data mainly from the epidemiological
studies that survey the results from the use of products by
actual consumers
.
The products to be consumed by human bodies, i.e.,
food and drugs, are tested in the laboratory before they go
on the market, and the FDA is responsible for judging the
safety of food and drugs. The safety of other products is
judged based on voluntary research by the manufacturers.
The risk information obtained through post-sale research,
e.g., statistics on injuries during the use of products,
may prompt the safety agencies to start regulating those
products. Transportation vehicles, however, are somewhat
different. The NHTSA requires that some safety tests, such
as of the crashworthiness of cars, be done before the
vehicles are sold to consumers.
78
. Research after sale also can be done in the final stage,
the implementation stage. See supra II, B, 3.
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The data for risk assessment typically come from four
important sources: 79 expert knowledge, information
accumulated by standardization bodies and regulation
agencies, 80 accident surveillance schemes or similar plans,
and information from consumers such as comparative test
results and consumer complaints. 81
Risk assessment in the labs requires expert
knowledge. 82 The data from lab experiments can be described
in two ways, quantitatively and qualitatively. The
threshold approach to hazard is a qualitative method,
whereas the linear approach to hazard is quantitative. The
quantitative method, taking into account progress in
scientific methodology, is considered the most important
method in the US. 83 However, neither quantitative nor
qualitative data explain chronic problems or attendant
circumstances, and, as a result, may mislead the decision
maker
.
84
79
. Data for risk management also come from same sources.
80
. The rapid- exchange system of information on dangerous
products in the EC is an example
.
81
. Id. at pp. 33-34. On information from consumers, see infra
at pp. 42-43 .
82
. The US's scientific and technological conclusions are
another expert knowledge which is almost automatically honored in
other countries, especially regarding products containing toxic
chemicals
.
83
. While the US, in most cases, does not use the qualitative
method any more, other developed countries such as Canada and the
UK, in many cases still stress the threshold approach. See Kathryn
Harrison and George Hoberg, Risk, Science and Politics, pp. 171-
173 (1994) .
84
. Otway and Peltu, at p . 6.
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Let us consider some risk assessment practices in the
US, for example. As an accident surveillance scheme, the
famous National Electronic Injury Surveillance System
(NEISS) has been used in the US since mid-1972, after
unification of the Food Drug Administration (FDA)'s
National Injury Surveillance System and the National
Commission on Product Safety's Hospital Emergency Room
Injury Reporting System. 85 The NEISS supplies information
related to injuries from more than 1,000 product groups,
information on consumers, and related background
information. 86 The information comes from the hospital
emergency rooms. Then the results are extrapolated to the
national average. 87
The surveillance schemes investigate two kinds of
accidents, deaths and injuries from products. The US uses
the Medical Examiner and Coroners Alert System (MECAP) and
the death certificate data base supplied by the CSPC. 88 The
death certificate data base has details on deaths related
to products. 89 In cases of injury, the US has a data-
collecting system centering on hospital records, which may
85
. OECD 1991, at p. 42, note 14, 15. In the EC, a home
accident surveillance system is the counterpart of the US system.
8b
. These product groups are selected as representative.
87
.
Viscusi, at p. 49.
88
. According to the OECD Report, other OECD member countries
than Sweden, Holland, the United States and the United Kingdom
have weak death data on the products and the process of death, or
may not commonly use even weak data.
89
. OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, Product Safety:
Developing and Implementing Measures, at p. 10 (1987) [hereinafter,
OECD 1987] .
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include data from interviews with the victims. In the CPSA,
the Commission maintains the Injury Information
Clearinghouse to gather statistical and epidemiological
information on injury and death as well as economic loss or
health impairment. 90 The National Commission on Product
Safety (NCPS) describes injury and death data not only in
terms of the total number of incidents but also in terms of
the total cost to society. 91 The NCPS's report deals with
sixteen consumer products that, unreasonably, were not
safe. 92
The CSPC's priorities are based on the following: data
on the frequency and severity of injuries; the causes of
injuries and their amenability to policy influences; the
unforeseen nature of the risk; the vulnerability of the
population at risk; the probability of exposure to the
hazard,- 93 and analysis of chronic illnesses, future injuries
and costs and benefits. The necessity for safety
regulation should become clear in the preliminary stage of
risk assessment. People select a specific product,
unconsciously or consciously, after comparing quality
including safety features, price and other special
purposes, such as the speed thrill of a motor cycle. 94
Under a perfect market, individuals' demands on quality,
90
. CPSA Section 5 (a!
Lemov, at 1.09.
Id.
Viscusi, at p . 43
Id. at p. 1.
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price and special purpose may meet the manufacturers'
calculation of consumers' demands at the equilibrium. 95
However, the necessity for intervention by safety agencies
arises if the safety of a product is below the consumers'
demands or the government -recommended standard.
3 . Risk Management Stage
a. Survey of Overall Measures and Their Data
1) Rule Making96 and Adjudication
Risk management in US government agencies has two
facets: rule making and adjudication. Rule making means
"the promulgation of generally applicable requirements or
standards governing future conduct," while adjudication
means determination of "the legal consequences of past
events in a particular controversy between specific
parties." 97 Therefore, mandatory standards, regulations,
95
. Id. at p. 2.
96
. The CPSA's procedure has modified that of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and is different depending on
measures; standards and bans follow Section 7-9; disclosure of
information, Section 6; recall, Section 15; rule making on
inspection and record keeping, Section 16. The FHSA and FFA have
their own procedure modifying APA procedure.
97
. Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative
Law and Regulatory Policy, at p. 398-399 (1979) [hereinafter,
Breyer and Stewart] . Breyer and Stewart think this distinction
somewhat absurd because each may share some of the others'
characteristics. On the definition of rule, see Breyer and
Stewart, at p. 407; adjudication here is a remnant of the
definition of rule making as administrative activity.
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and statutes are part of rule making; on the other hand,
bans, recalls and cancellations of admission of import are
part of the adjudication facet of risk management.
The procedures for rule making and adjudication are
different. Rule making, generally, follows the notice-and-
comment procedure, while adjudication adopts a trial-like
proceeding. The former process requires more commitment of
time and energy than the latter. Their characteristics are
also different. The former, rule making, targets the
future, while adjudication attempts to mend the past. The
scope of judicial review is also different. Rule making
prefers consistency and uniformity to the individuality of
adjudication and is clearer and more publicized. The former
usually allows participation by the interested. Selection
between them as policy measures depends on many
considerations
.
98
Rule making can be divided into notice-and- comment
rulemaking and on-the-record rulemaking; in other words,
informal rule making and the formal rule making. These
require differing degrees of substantial evidence depending
on the decisions to be made. Informal rule making is
satisfied with any information or sources of knowledge."
Hybrid rule making, between informal rule making and
formal rule making, 100 was created so that it can use
98
. Id. at p. 404
.
99
. Id. at p. 4 80.
10 °. Id. at p. 501
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documents in a hearing procedure. It is a trial style
without the parties' presence, oral testimony, or cross
examination. 101 Hybrid rule making has merits such as the
clarification of goals as well as impact evaluation of a
broad range of alternatives. 102
2) Specific Measures
The measures utilized by product safety agencies may
be mandatory or voluntary. Voluntary standards and
voluntary rating systems are obviously some examples of
voluntary measures, 103 whereas the mandatory measures may
take the form of mandatory standards -setting such as pre-
market clearance and approval before sale, the hazard-
reporting duty of the manufacturer, certification
requirements, continuous inspection, regulation of the end
products and PPMs, product ban or recall, the blacklisting
of manufacturers who do not meet standards, red- tagging to
shut down a piece of dangerous equipment, fines including
criminal charges, injunctions and cease orders to eliminate
101
. This is one of EPA' s rule making methods. See id. at pp.
509-510. In Appalachian Power Co. V. Ruckelshaus, 477 F. 2d.
495 (4th Cir. 1973), certain types of technical issues require
limited cross examination. See, id. p. 511.
102
. Id. at p. 8.
103
. As a voluntary industry rating system for product safety
may work as a tactic to get competitive low-quality product makers
out of competition, regulations are often introduced for the
protection of such companies and out of deference to consumers'
freedom of choice. These voluntary measures will be discussed in
another section.
36
unsafe practices of a manufacturer, and the like. 104 These
measures exist within the statutes or regulations, in part
or in all, under different names, in different countries.
These mandatory measures may then be classified into
preparatory actions, regulatory actions, corrective
actions, and monitoring actions, depending on the time of
application. 105
The CPSA's risk management techniques include
mandatory standards, bans, recalls, imminent procedures,
penalties and so forth. The mandatory standards and bans
are issued based on the unreasonable risk involved, 106 while
recalls are based on the existence of substantial hazard. 107
The mandatory standards consist of requirements
"expressed in term of performance" whenever feasible and
the manifestation by warnings or instructions or by any
requirements "reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an
unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product."
These requirements are identical to the voluntary
104
. The range of discretion on the same measure by regulators
is also different depending on countries. The most frequently used
measure against dangerous products in most countries is the ban of
use of the product in question. The second and third are
limitation of the quantity of dangerous substances in products at
issue and labeling or packaging requirements, if a product is
indispensable and there are no other practical methods. Both of
these are mandatory standards or certification requirements.
Regarding the ban, each country has a negative substance list
where specific toxic substances are prohibited; however, the range
varies somewhat. See, OECD 1974, at pp. 7-8.
105
. OECD 1987, at p. 7 and 26.
106
. CPSA Section 7 (a) and 8. Hereinafter, "mandatory
standards" is used with the same meaning as "specification."
107
. CPSA Section 15.
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standards' requirements. 108 The CPSC can ban any hazardous
products which do not meet the mandatory standards, 109 or
when the condition is such that "no feasible standards
[can] protect the public from the unreasonable risk," e.g.,
injury from products. 110
The requirement for a recall is a violation of
existing safety rules or a product defect that creates "a
substantial risk of injury to the consumer." A recall is
used in order to shorten the time required in making the
standards from more than a year to a mere several weeks. 111 A
recall requires manufacturers to provide notification112 of
replacement, repairs or refund. 113 The prerequisites of a
ban, "unreasonable risk" and "appropriateness, " have the
possibility of arbitrary interpretation, as do those of a
recall, e.g., "a substantial product hazard," unless they
have clear criteria.
The first action by the CPSC in a ban is to file a
complaint and a motion for an injunction in court so as to
seize the dangerous products. 114 A civil penalty115 or
criminal penalty 116 may be imposed on those who violate the
108
. CPSA Section 7 (b) (1)
Viscusi, at p. 42.
CPSA Section 8
.
Viscusi, at p . 63
.
CPSA Section 15 (c)
.
CPSA Section 15 (d)
CPSA Section 12 (a)
CPSA section 20.
CPSA section 21.
109
110
111
112
113
114
US
116
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CPSA's provisions, e.g., the manufacturer, the distributor,
the retailer or the importer whose products do not conform
to the safety standards. 117 When the CPSC finds that
imported products, before their entrance into the US
territory, violate safety requirements, the CPSC can refuse
their admission. 118 Some may argue that this refusal of
admission is a fatal measure to exporters and related
industries, in contrast with the situation that domestic
industry can repair or notice or replace the products in
violation of the same requirement. However, because only
the MFN treatment of the GATT, not the national treatment,
is applied before the products' entry into the country,
such discriminatory treatment of imported products is still
legal under the TBT.
Recalls and voluntary standards are more frequently
issued than mandatory standards. The reasons are not only
that the courts have unfriendly attitudes toward mandatory
standards for fear that the courts as well as the safety
agencies would have to share responsibilities for injuries
or deaths that might happen after they authorize mandatory
standards, but that Congress has also criticized the
practices of making mandatory standards and cut the budgets
of safety agencies for political gain. 119 As a result, the
function of making specifications of product safety is
117
. CPSA Section 19.
118
. CPSA section 17.
119
. Lemov at 3.12, note 6 and 3.13, 3-19
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nowadays in the hands of private standard makers, and the
safety agencies just monitor their efficiency with such
mandatory measures as recalls or bans. 120
3) Dangerous Products: General Control or Specific Control
The risk management method for chemical substances and
products may be general control or specific control.
General control decides the safety of finished or end
products using criteria such as the reasonableness,
acceptableness, and substantiality of the risks. Whether a
product is safe or not is determined through those
criteria. General control preserves the freedom for
manufacturers to be innovative because they can adopt any
technology to obtain the acceptable level of safety and get
the agency's approval. The disadvantages in this system
are the possibility of procrastination of approval and the
uncertainty of approval . The criteria and the procedures of
approval are normally published beforehand to foreign
manufacturers
.
Specific control may take the form of publishing which
substances are permitted and, even if substances are
permitted, the maximum quantity of those substances. This
style of control does not deal with final products. The
problem here is that it can sometimes discourage the
120
. On standards, see supra Chapter II, D, 3
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innovation of the manufacturers. On the other hand,
exporting countries need not worry about the time required
for the approval and the unpredictability of approval as in
the case of general control. Moreover, specific control
can be easily harmonized on an international level, while
general control allows various practices in individual
countries over a wide range. 121 Specific control is commonly
used for food, drugs, agricultural products, cosmetics and
pesticides, while general control is used for most
household products. 122
b. Decision on a Measure and its Details
1) Common Requirements
The criteria for the decision on acceptable risk in
the CPSA's measures 123 are "unreasonable risk" of products
and "substantial risk" of a defect. 124 These criteria bear
on such factors as the pattern of the defect, the number of
defective products, the severity of risk and the cost and
benefit analysis. 125 As can be seen from these terms, the
121
. OECD 1974, at pp. 35-36.
122
. Id. at p. 38. On the definition of cosmetics and
household products, see id. at pp. 42-44.
123
. Scher 1973, at p. 30.
124
. CPSA Section 15 .
125
. Scher 1973, at p. 57. Other laws also have similar terms:
in FDA, "substantial risk," and in OSHA, "significant risk."
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bridge between risk assessment and risk management rests on
such vague words as substantial" and "unreasonable."
Measures under the CPSA should be issued in the public
interest but also to minimize adverse effects on
competition. 126 For this purpose, cost-benefit analysis was
introduced in the 1981 Amendments to the CSPA. This
analysis is vulnerable, however, to the influence of safety
agencies' philosophies, objects and motives. 127
The CPSC prepares the data to describe the potential
benefits and costs of the chosen measures, even those costs
and benefits that cannot be quantified in monetary terms.
For example, in the case of lead poisoning, there has been
some criticism that the CPSC simply calculated the costs in
cents per gallon without considering many intangible
factors such as the lead level in children's blood, the
relation of lead exposure levels to individual health, and
the overall expense of such harmful effects on health. 128
The critics say that the CSPC should have considered
whether the ban on the paint containing lead would give
consumers greater health benefits than total costs. 129
The CPSC is not expected to perform the cost-benefit
analysis as a strict requirement but rather as a flexible
126
. Id.
127
. OECD 1987, at p. 15. For example, the US is thought to
have more parentalism when drafting regulations than Canada,
focusing on excessive protection of the consumer.
128
. Id. at p. 44
.
129
. Id. Another example is a lawn mower specification case.
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mandate. 130 While agencies under the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) mostly consider and perform cost-benefit
analysis as the most important element in decision,
independent agencies like the CPSC just refer cost-benefit
analysis to unreasonable risk judgment as a supplement. 131
Adjudication must not be used if a standard would
"adequately protect the public from the unreasonable risk
of injury." 132 The requirements in the adjudication process
are judged based on the findings on such issues as the
degree and nature of the risk of injury, the approximate
number of consumer products subject to the rule, and the
indispensability to the public of that particular product.
2) Participation
One of the most important elements that can bring
about different results in risk management is who
participates in the regulatory process, e.g., consumers,
industries, employees, mass media, etc. 133 Participation by
consumers is one of the most important factors. 134 Consider
130
. Id. at p. 43. The other agencies are strictly supervised
by OMB.
131
. Viscusi, at p. 44.
132
. Id. at p. 42.
133
. Cummings, at pp. 13 0-136.
134
. Foreign industries 's participation is rare though very
influential. For example, five OECD member countries adopted
statutes on cosmetics safety that introduced a private trade
association to create voluntary standards and provide
surveillance. Among them, only the UK and the US gave foreign
exporters the chance to participate in making regulations. See
43
this example. When the FDA announced the proposal of a ban
of saccharin because of its carcinogenicity, the diabetes
association appealed and mobilized the mass media focusing
on what those with juvenile diabetes and those employed in
related industries would suffer from the ban. This
mobilization was dramatic because people personalized the
possible agonies which would result from the FDA'
s
decision. Industries that used saccharin also attacked the
FDA report, which warned of the possibility of cancer if an
average adult consumed 800 cans of diet soda a day, and
appealed that there was no substitute for saccharin. The
frustrated FDA gave up the idea of a ban on saccharin.
In order to prevent undue influence from industries,
the CPSC prohibits its staff and employees from having any
relations with them. 135 For example, they do not have the
voting right to decide voluntary standard proposed by the
private standardization bodies. 136
3) Decision Cases
An excellent example of the attitude of the product
safety agencies toward scientific evidence can be seen in
the carcinogen standard and the ban on aspartame and
cylamate as food additives. At first, aspartame was
OECD 1973, at p. 42, 53-57.
136
. Lemov at 3.11. CPSA Section 4 (c]
136
. Lemov at 3.11, 3-17, note 8.
44
petitioned in 1973 to the FDA for sale as an ingredient in
dry foods, powdered beverages and tabletop sweeteners. The
FDA approved it on the condition that a warning be attached
for people who have phenylketonuria. However, before it
went on sale, formal opposition was publicized that it was
especially harmful to children and pregnant women, possibly
causing brain tumors or mental retardation. The FDA
suspended its use in 1975 for further study and created
Board of Inquiry to review the reports from fifteen safety
studies
.
The FDA subsequently permitted the use of aspartame in
dry foods with a warning label in 1980, under the condition
that the manufacturers voluntarily monitor the product and
notify the FDA of any possibility of harm. This decision
was made contrary to two scientific reports: one by Richard
Wurtman, a specialist in neuroendocrine regulation, and the
other by the Center for Science in the Public Interest,
which warned that it may cause chemical changes in the
brain when combined with carbohydrates. The FDA also
approved its use in soft drinks and wet foods.
Saccharin and aspartame survived the battle, though
they are regarded as more dangerous than cyclamate among
scientists. Their survival demonstrates that adjuciations
45
are often issued without inconsistence in value judgment on
the scientific report. 137
In 1958 the FDA listed cyclamate, another artificial
sweetener, in the Generally Recognized As Safe list (GRAS
list) after it analyzed comments of the scientists on
safety questionnaires. The FDA did not perform any tests on
it because there were no indications of harm in the reports
of the scientists. It was then sold in great amounts in the
wake of the fitness fad. However, subsequent reports of
possible harm as well as the aggressive lobbying and
advertisement of the sugar industry prompted the FDA to
initiate animal experiments. After cancer symptoms were
discovered in the lab animals, the FDA banned cyclamate. 138
In this instance the FDA made its decision following
these negative reports instead of those positive reports
that pointed out that saccharin and other additives in
processed foods were more harmful than cyclamate. When the
FDA assessed the risk of cyclamate and decided measures and
acceptable risk, it carried out experiments on cyclamate
and did not carry out experiments on its substitute,
saccharin. 139 Many subsequent reports after the ban supported
the relative safety of cyclamate, but whether or not
cyclamate is a carcinogen to human bodies is still
137 In Canada there is no restriction on the sale of
cyclamate, but saccharin was banned, contrary to the decision of
the US. See Cummings, at p. 13 9.
138
.
Cummings, at pp. 123-127.
13\ Id. at p. 130.
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uncertain. Nonetheless, the public and the beverage
companies now show lukewarm attitudes toward the banned
cyclamate, 14 ° and most beverage companies have discontinued
cyclamate in their products. 141
Whether a substance is a carcinogen is based on
Delaney's zero-risk cancer standard, which states that "no
additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or by animal." However,
the Delaney Amendment has been criticized on account of
inaccuracy and inefficiency. The critics argue that
extrapolation from animal experiments to humans can
possibly contain errors, and that the zero-tolerance policy
is unnecessarily rigid and prohibits the possible
significance of other product features and freedom of
choice
.
142
140 Id. at p. 128.
141
. Id. at p. 12 9.
142
. Id. at pp. 133-134
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B. Safety Standards on Products 143
1. Regulation and Standard
The regulation makers and the standard makers are
largely different from three perspectives. 144 Firstly, from
an economic prospective, the former usually overestimates
the benefits and underestimates the costs, while the latter
usually overestimates costs and underestimates benefits.
Secondly, in the regulatory philosophy perspective, the
regulation makers have the view that manufacturers should
follow enhanced technological standards. They have a more
paternalistic tendency to protect consumers from harmful
products than the standard makers. The standard makers, on
the other hand, try to understand industrial situations,
assuming that buyers are clever enough to judge the
products for themselves. Standards are based on the
technology feasible to the industry and are protective of
managerial discretion. They tend to put the practices and
the technical and economical feasibility of industry in the
foremost position, while the regulation makers try to
consider a variety of opinions from participants.
Regulation makers set early deadlines for compliance, while
143
. On examples of product safety standards, see Bass at p
94, table 5-1.
144
. Ross E. Cheit, Seting Safety Standards, at pp. 205-206
(1990) .
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standard makers are careful in the adoption of unproven and
new technology. These differences result from the fact
that standard makers are concerned about product liability
more often than regulation makers. Such concern dictates
that standard makers avoid addressing issues of consumer
misuse and embracing new technologies. Regulations are
usually made by lawyers, while standards are set by
engineers
.
Thirdly, from an evolutionary perspective, while the
standard makers have a prospective view, regulation makers
have a retrospective one. 145 Regulation makers usually
intervene after a crisis, or a major disaster, while
standards are usually set in order to avoid such disasters.
Most countries adopt either or both of them as a risk
management strategy. Nonetheless, the degree of dependence
on either may be different. 146
The CPSC tried to set mandatory standards but was
frustrated by the unfriendly attitudes of courts and the
Congress. As a result, it has occasionally turned to
private standards. Meanwhile, the European Community (EC)
is more dependent on standards than the US. The EC has the
directives on general safety and standards; relevant laws
of the member states are subject to these directives. Most
product safety standards in the EC are made by the private
145
. Id. at pp. 17-20.
146
. This different degree may influence on foreign exporters
with different severity of trade pressure.
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standardization bodies, such as the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for
Electro-Technical Standardization (CENLEC)
.
147 Contrary to
the developed countries, the developing countries have few
private institutions that are able to get safety standards
due to a lack of money finance and experts. Most
institutions are usually monopolized by their government,
and standards are also rare. Therefore, the voluntariness
of standards is really weak in most developing countries.
2. Conditions
The CPSC can set mandatory standards under the CPSA if
voluntary standards are not complied with or if the
compliance with such voluntary standards would not
eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury. 148 The
issue here is how the CPSC interprets the above conditions,
147
. The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the
European Committee for Electro-Technical Standardization (CENELEC)
are private associations whose members are the eighteen national
standardization bodies. However, CEN and CENELEC 's drafted
standards are publicized to members of ISO/IEC, which then make
comments on them. The areas not covered by the European
standardization scheme are under national standard-making
organizations. National member organizations, EC Commission, or
industrial federations can initiate the standardization project.
Proposed standards are usually decided by consensus. Then,
national member organizations start to modify the standards.
European standardization usually starts from the initiation of
ISO/IEC, whose representative national member organizations are
British Standards Institution (BSD , Deutsches Institut fur
Normung(DIN) , American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
Association Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR) . See GATT, Trade
Policy Review: European Communities 1991, at p. 122, 123 and 125
(1991); OECD 1991, at p. 23.
14fl
. CPSA Section 7 (a) .
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because only the CPSC can determine the existence of one of
those situations as a pre- judiciary decision.
The CPSC's interpretation was in the beginning
favorable toward mandatory standards. The CPSC's vigorous
attempts to create mandatory standards were, however,
frustrated by the court's denial of the agency's ambitious
regulation scheme and budget reduction by Congress. 149 As a
result, the CPSC started resorting to recalls and bans. 150
Eventually, the CPSC seems to have concluded that it should
only set comprehensive general safety specifications or
general provisions and entrust the details to private
standards, while monitoring the private standard makers'
activities and regularly performing inspections and surveys
over their operations.
3 . Characteristics
Despite their voluntariness, a good number of
standards have turned out to be economic mandates against
manufacturers, sellers, or distributors, because they
recognize that they will be out of competition unless they
follow those standards. This power of standards is
demonstrated in the showdown between the UL standards and
the CPSC standards on a woodstove. Product liability
149
. Lemov, at 3.09.
150
. OECD 1991, at p. 12
51
insurance and the local building code require wood stoves
to follow the UL safety standards rather. than CPSC's
specifications. Without the UL marks, the premium is
higher, and the product cannot be used as material for
buildings
.
151
Furthermore, recent trends see voluntary standards
being more utilized than mandatory standards of government
agencies on the international level. 152 The reason is
attributable to the limited capacity of the safety
agencies. As a compromise, product safety agencies
prescribe general product safety regulations and laws and
entrust the power to make specific standards to non-
governmental bodies, controlling their compliance with a
ban or a recall. 153
There are three points to consider in judging the
standards. 154 The first is the general nature of products,
i.e., their performance or characteristics. Therefore, a
standard can be either a performance standard or a
characteristic standard. Compliance with a performance
standard can be judged by a performance attribute test,
such as a flammability test of clothing materials. Most
standards are claimed to be performance standards, but many
151
. Cheit, at p. 95.
152
. The other two of three distinctive trends nowadays are
the regionalization of standards and mutual recognition instead of
harmonization. See, OECD 1991, at p. 11.
153
. OECD 1991, at p. 12.
lb4
. These three considerations are also true of mandatory
standards
.
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of these are, in fact, characteristic standards because
some performance standards derived from one feasible design
for compliance. The second consideration is the scope and
level of protection intended by the standards. The
standards do not mean only one level of standard for one
product. Depending on different degrees of safety features,
different measures can be taken. The third consideration is
applicability. It costs less for new products to comply
with strict standards than for existing products. Strict
regulation is therefore rational for new products. The
costs of compliance should be embodied in similar products
with the same ratio as much as possible. 155
4 . US Practices
a. Types of Voluntary Standard Makers
According to the National Bureau of Standards, 420
nongovernmental standard organizations compiled 32,000
standards, of which health and safety standards take up the
largest part . The private standard makers may be trade
associations, professional societies, general membership
155
. Viscusi, at pp. 24-26.
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organizations, and third party certifiers. These four
groups regard due process and consensus as very important. 156
The trade associations, such as the American Petroleum
Institute, make few product safety standards. They are
driven by their closed structure and homogeneous members
for their interests. Professional societies and general
membership organizations have more diverse members than the
trade associations, but the general membership
organizations have a broader range of members and are more
related to public safety. Examples of these are the
Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society of
Agricultural Engineers; examples of the professional
societies are the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) and the National Fire Protection
Association (NEPA) , which have various members including
competitors. Most standards the general membership
organizations have drafted deal with public safety
including product safety. The general membership
organizations have arranged their budget by means of sales
of their publications and standards. Third party certifiers
test the product in the light of standards and make their
own standards. For example, Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
,
the National Sanitation Foundation, which certifies
156
. Cheit. at pp. 21-23. Consensus here does not mean the
consensus in Chapter II, D, 1. Consensus here means less than
animosity and more than majority.
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restaurant equipment, and the International Association of
Plumbing and Mechanical Officials are some of examples. 157
b. Their Practices
All private standard makers do not slant toward the
industry's interest. Other organizations than trade
associations are often asked to set standards independently
in order to serve the clients of the trade organizations. 158
The procedure for making private standards is often similar
to that for mandatory standards in terms of such features
as the not ice -and-comment procedure and the guarantee of
interest groups' participation. For example, the Board of
Standards Review, which reviews appeals from the standards
of the ANSI and ASTM, allows consumers to participate in
making standards. Some private standard makers insist on
their professionalism and impartiality, and not all
standard makers are controlled by determining industrial
interests. Nonetheless, their efforts still fall short of
those of mandatory standard makers. 159
The private standard makers in most OECD countries
utilize consumer participation. For example, the ANSI has
the Consumer Interest Council to incorporate consumers'
attitudes toward products in their standard-making
157
. Id. at pp. 23-25.
1SB
. Id. at pp. 11-14
.
159
. Id. at pp. 14-17
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process. 160 The International Organization of Standards (ISO)
also utilizes consumer participation in a similar way.
c. Specific Standard Makers
ANSI can be called a coordinator and certifier of
overall national voluntary standards, although it does not
make standards but only approves standards proposed by
other standard makers. 900 standards of ANSI's 8,500
certified standards are under the category of "safety and
health" and consist of procedural and substantive
standards. The members of ANSI are industry representatives
and standard makers including governmental product safety
agencies . 161
Other important private standard makers are the
American Gas Association (AGA) which approves standards for
gas appliances, and the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) whose Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is
incorporated into law in the US and Canada. 162 Also, the
ASTM's F-15 Committee has developed product safety
standards for such items as high chairs, cigarette lighters
and bathtub grab bars. 163 In local or provincial building
160
. OECD 1991, at p. 35
161
. Id', at p. 26.
162 The Supreme Court decided that this code is anti-
competitive in 1983. Id. at p. 27, note 8.
163
. The relation between ASTM and ANSI broke up and the
former no longer files standards for approval to the latter. Id.
at p. 27.
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codes, references have been made to the codes drafted by
the International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO)
,
the Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI)
the Building Officials and Code Administrators
International (BOCA) , and the Council of American Building
Code Officials (CABO). 164 The NEPA's National Electric Code
and Life Safe Code are also frequently referred to by other
laws. 165 Furthermore, the UL has safety standards on
microwave ovens, fire extinguishers, and so forth. 166
If a private company's purchasing power is great due
to its large size, its standards in purchasing heavily
influence the suppliers of those products. Retailers
generally quote the private safety standards. For example,
J.C. Penny, a huge retailer, incorporates private safety
standards into its purchase orders. 167
164
. Despite domination like the above, local building codes
are still broad depending on the region, the type of construction
and the standards of the insurance industry. In addition, those
building codes usually quote standards drafted by other types of
standard makers. For examples, many UL standards are incorporated
into local building codes. Gas utilities can be installed only
when complying with safety standard of American Gas Association
(AGA) . Id. at p. 28.
165
. Id.
166
. Id.
167
. Id. at p. 9.
CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 2.2 OF THE TBT
A. History
1. From GATT XX (b) to TBT
Before the TBT, the rules of international risk
assessment and risk management of product safety were
provided by GATT. The relevant provisions in GATT provided
that a GATT member state may issue "measures . . . necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health," unless
those measures are "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade" 168
and discriminate against foreign goods outside of a
Contracting Country compared with domestic goods. 169 GATT
also required that those measures "pertaining to
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports . .
.
or affecting their sale, distribution . . . insurance, [or]
warehousing inspection" should be published. 170
lee. gaTT Article XX body and Article I
169
. GATT Article III.
170
. GATT Article X.
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Article XX (b) is a representative provision on the
national risk assessment and risk management of product
safety, and this provision has been called the mother
provision of the TBT. However, since Article XX (b) has
been shown to impose limits on national sovereignty over
health and safety legitimacy, some protectionistic
countries have tried to interpret their sovereignty very
broadly in regards to all areas of the NTBs. 171 This
protectionism has become a wake-up call to the free-trade
believers
.
Despite the urgent need for an international agreement
on technical barriers, due to diversity and complication it
took twelve years to conclude the NTBs. 172 After the
decision in the Tokyo Round to develop health and safety
regulations, the TBT was adopted on April 12, 1979 and
entered into effect on January 1, 1980. 173 They decided that
"the only way to remove NTBs was to write new and clearer
rules defining what governments could and could not do with
171
. Houtte, at p. 13 0, note 9.
172
. OECD 1991, at pp. 17-18; within the OECD region the
matters on safety regulations and standards make up 5 or 10
percent of all technical barriers. Most of them are related to
electrical appliances. Despite the ratio, they have significant
effects. On difficulty of measuring the effect of NTBs, see
Jackson, at p. 364. Oliver Long thinks that it is almost
impossible to measure. The agreements on NTBs are agreements on
subsidies and countervailing duties, customs valuation,
anti -dumping, import licensing procedures and government
procurement. See, Oliver Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT
Multilateral Trade System, at p. 2 5 and 2 8 (19 85) . The cost in EC
due to differences in health and safety standards and regulations
amounts to 60 billion dollars annually. See Houtte, at p. 129,
note 4
.
173
. There are thirty-nine member states as of 1990.
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various non-tariff policy instruments." 174 The TBT embodied
the new enforcement system that has been discussed.
2 . The Revised TBT on Risk Assessment and Risk Management
Of TBT175
The revised TBT incorporates new provisions on risk
assessment and risk management into the existing TBT. Its
Preamble states that health and safety measures can be set
"at the levels a country considers appropriate." This
notion of national discretion in risk management raises the
possibility of a controversy over its meaning. The second
sentence in Article 2.2 was therefore inserted in order to
address the issue of the relationship between free trade
and national sovereignty: risk assessment and risk
management should be w . . . not more trade restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a protection of human health or safety
taking account of risks."
Article 1.5 of the revised TBT transfers to the ASPM
the newly introduced regulation on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on the products to be consumed by
human bodies. The ASPM is a special Agreement to TBT, which
was proposed during the UR. Under the Negotiating Structure
174
. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, at p
25 (1993) .
175
. The provision on risk assessment and risk management is
Article 1.1 in the previous TBT and in the current TBT, the
Preamble and Article 2.2.
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and Plan of the UR prepared by the Group of Negotiations on
Goods (GNG) , the Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS)
and the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) set three
negotiable plans in agriculture.
The principle of "'minimizing the adverse effects that
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can
have on trade in agriculture," inter alia, was the first
plan. 176 Then, in the mid- term review of the Trade
Negotiations Committee, the prototype of the ASPM was
drafted. 177 The trade negotiators agreed on four main areas
of agriculture, one of which was the ASPM. 178 Since the "oil
seed dispute" between the US and the EC, 179 these four areas
were packed into one package which required all or zero
approval
.
B. Application
The TBT is mandatorily applied to all GATT member
states, unless they abandon membership of the new GATT
through Article-XXI procedure in GATT. 180 This is a great
departure from the previous TBT, which was only applicable
176
. GATT, GATT Activities Annual Review 1987, at p. 126
[hereinafter, GATT 1987] ; On the program to harmonize the national
ASPM regulation, see GATT, GATT Activities Annual Review 1988, at
p. 35 and 38 (1988) [hereinafter, GATT 1988]
.
177
. GATT 1988, at p. 138.
178
. Hudec, at pp. 183-4, 188; other areas are "market
access," "domestic support" and "export subsidies."
179
. Id. at p. 186.
180
.
GATT Article 15.2.
61
to the members of the TBT itself. The TBT applies to all
products in international trade except those regulated by-
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 181 The technical
regulations and standards in Article 2.2 of TBT are
applicable to both the characteristics and the process and
production methods (PPMs) of the product. 182 The TBT treats
standards differently from regulations. The standards are
not bound by such requirements as "not more trade
restrictive than necessary to fulfill," the strict
existence of legitimacy, and risk assessment. 183
According to the definition of product safety
regulations and standards in the TBT, judiciary decisions
on product safety are not taken into consideration. 184
However, in countries like the US, where judiciary
decisions are very influential in the risk management
mechanism, court decisions on product safety are usually
reflected in the safety regulations.
i8i
_ TBT Article 1.3. On the kinds of products, relevant laws
and definition, see CPSA Section 3 (a) . Eliza Patterson,
International Efforts to Minimize the Adverse Trade Effects of
National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations, Journal of World
Trade, Vol. 24 No. 2, at pp. 92-93 (April, 1990).
182
. Annex I, Article 1 of TBT. See 30 I.L.M. 1594(1991); the
product safety regulation and standard is one of the technical
regulations and standards. Recently, developing countries have
felt that many safety regulations in developed countries will be
more related to PPMs; for example, in the legislation of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in Tuna Dolphin case. The
introduction of PPMs is likely to create more trade battles.
183
_ TBT Article 5, Annex 3: Code of Good Practice.
184
. TBT Annex 1.
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C . Requirements
1. General Requirements
A general requirement throughout the TBT is that the
technical regulations and standards should not be an
unnecessary trade obstacle. For example, in order to
prevent regulations from becoming an unnecessary trade
obstacle, a country should discontinue certain regulations
when the circumstances or objectives which prompted them no
longer exist, or when new circumstances or objectives
require less trade restrictive measures. 185
There must be a reasonable time period between the
publication or announcement of a new technical regulation
and its implementation so that other countries can respond
and cope with the change. 186 Countries issuing adjudications
should also notify alleged violators and give them a chance
to respond or explain, as is the case in the CPSA. 187
The safety agencies of an importing country may
require exporters to disclose certain trade secrets, e.g.,
methods of production. However, if the disclosure of a
trade secret is required in a country where no protection
is guaranteed against other competitors, it will discourage
185
. TBT Article 2 . 3 .
186
_ TBT Article 2 . 12
187
. CPSA Section 15 .
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exporters from trading with that country; 188 therefore, such
practice would become a trade obstacle. 189 In some cases,
some developing countries intentionally impose higher
standards than their domestic standards or require
disclosure of technologies in order to acquire advanced
foreign technology from the more advanced exporting
countries
.
If a regulation gives de facto competitive
disadvantage to an exporter when compared with the domestic
industry in the importing country, it can become an
unnecessary trade obstacle. Suppose that company X in
England cannot get product liability insurance necessary to
export to the US at a reasonable cost. It would have a
disadvantage in penetrating the US market because of the
increased cost. The higher premium on export products
results from the safety standards of the US, whose
technology and practices are different from those of the
exporter.
Moreover, consider the difficulty for exporting
countries in acquiring certifications from private or
governmental safety institutions. Their products may fall
short of the expectations of consumers. The independent
198
. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the CPSA in the
US protect trade secrets. This can be a touchstone for other
countries. See Lemov, at 3.10, note 9-15.
189
. Breyer and Stewart, at p. 1060. In the US under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) , trade secrets and commercial
information and information not allowed to be disclosed according
to other laws are exemptions to disclosure [5 U.S.C. Section 552
(b) (3) , (4)] .
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importers and related entities would worry about
susceptibility to liability to the injured consumers or
even criminal charges. 190 Therefore, the exporters may
face, de facto, a rejection or stringent requests by the
importers
. Then the practices of an importing country that
requires higher standards than the exporting country become
a de facto trade obstacle.
The clause that regulations should "not be prepared,
adopted and applied with a view to or with the effect ..."
in the scope covers the entire stages of risk assessment
and risk management for product safety. 191 Then, during the
entire stages, the activities of safety agencies should not
be an unnecessary obstacle requirement.
2 . Specific Requirements
a. Free Trade's Superiority to Safety Legitimacy
The free trade principle appears to have more weight
than safety legitimacy, according to the clause "not more
trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate
objective." Therefore, it is difficult to apply here
Daniel E. Esty's theory that the US Supreme Court's balance
190
. Abbott, at p. 20. Exporting companies that have exclusive
distribution contracts or equivalent subsidiaries are in a much
more comfortable situation.
1,1
. Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, at pp. 113-130 (1994).
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test between interstate trade and environmental protection
can be applied to the relation between the international
trade and environmental protection. The environmentalists
in the US would argue that environmental legitimacy is more
important than free trade
.
b. Necessity192
The meaning of the clause, "necessary to fulfil a
legitimate goal," is that regulations should be the last
resort for product safety. 193 Analogous to the Tuna Dolphin
cases, a regulation which does not meet the necessity
requirement is a violation of the principles in GATT and
Article 2.2 of TBT. 194
The decision in Tuna Dolphin I describes the necessity
of a measure in this way: "it has exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the (GATT)." 195
Tuna Dolphin II described necessity in more detail
:
Contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with
another GATT provision as necessary in terms of Article XX
(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in
cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions
192
. The interpretation follows cases such as Tuna-Dolphin I,
Tuna Dolphin II, CAFE and the Gas Guzzler Tax case.
193
. On the same opinion, see Houtte, at p. 134; however, he
thought that "necessary" in GATT XX means at least larger
legitimate purpose than restrictive trade effects.
194
.
BISD 3d (1955), at p. 189 et seq.
195
. 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) .
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is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to
use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions. 196
This decision illustrates a narrow interpretation of
necessity to maintain the international free trade. It
shows a strict interpretation of the necessity of safety
protection to a degree that the importance of the safety
regulations should "take precedence over the requirements
of free movement of goods." 197 Even though the TBT does not
provide an exact definition of necessity, the
interpretation of GATT Article XX can be applied.
c. Discretion over Appropriateness
According to the Preamble to the TBT, Article 2.2
allows a member country to decide "the levels it considers
appropriate" on such issues as the degree of the risks to
be protected, the measures for protection of human safety,
and the nexus between risks and measures. The decision of
the appropriate level is left up to the national
government. The vagueness in this provision is one of the
greatest failures of the TBT, since the lack of exact
criteria allows a country to evade international
regulation. The TBT should provide specific provisions on
what appropriateness means and how to estimate it
.
196
. 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), note 85.
197
. Houtte, at p. 134, note 24 and 26.
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d. Risk Assessment
Article 2.2 explains how to utilize available
scientific and technical information, related processing
technology, and intended end uses of products in assessing
risks. This provision, however, is too broad and leaves
room for wide differences in its interpretation.
The first problem is determining the availability of
scientific and technical information. Often the parties in
a dispute must agree on the source of available
information. For example, in the case of Thailand's
restrictions on the importation of cigarettes from the US,
both parties agreed to use the scientific evidence from the
World Health Organization (WHO) as available information. 198
Without such agreement, it is difficult to define
availability. Moreover, if safety test reports contradict
each other, which report or theory should be adopted is a
difficult question. The dispute settlement panel sometimes
decides to set up an expert group for the decision on the
availability and selection of scientific and technological
theories
.
The second problem is that Article 2.2 does not
sufficiently describe the methodology of risk assessment
and risk management. The TBT should classify the
198
. GATT, GATT Activities 1990, at p . 59 (1990) [hereinafter,
GATT 1990] .
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differences among the member states in terms of the method
and process of their risk assessment and risk management
and then should decide on a uniform method and its
principles
.
D. Special Considerations
1. Harmonization of Standards or Specifications 199
a. A Harmonized Safety Standard, 200 ISO 9000 and the
Requirements in Article 2.2
The TBT encourages its member states to use
international standards or relevant parts of them as bases
for their national technical regulations while taking into
consideration their unique national situations. 201 For this
purpose, the TBT gives an advantage to a party that adopts
international standards by allowing the presumption of no
violation (thus lower burden) in dispute settlement
procedures. Therefore, if a country follows the
199
.
Specification means mandatory standards. Here,
"standards" may be used as either specification or standard.
200
. Houtte, at p. 129, note 3; the justification for
harmonization comes from the experience that differences of
regulations and standards cause a lack of scale economies, high
distribution and production costs, and higher research expense
because goods made in compliance with one country cannot be sold
in other country.
2oi
_
TBT Article 2.4.
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international standards, it does not have to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements in Article 2.2.
The ISO/IEC standards are an example of the
internationally harmonized standards. The International
Organization of Standards (ISO) was established in 1946 and
sets safety standards,- the International Electro-Technical
Commission (IEC), an affiliation of the ISO, was
established in 1906 and specializes in electronic matters. 202
Some sectors in international trade which use the ISO
standards for quality management standards include the
electronic, computer, aerospace, transportation, and
nuclear engineering industries, and the pharmaceutical and
health care sectors. 203 The ISO has many PPM standards for
regulating product quality management. One of these PPMs is
the famous ISO 9000 series, which includes quality control
in the safety of products as well as in the work place.
The ISO/IEC standards are often incorporated into
national safety standards. Japan, for example, adopted
fifteen additional standards since early 1990 that are
compatible with those of the IEC on household electrical
202 McGovern, at pp. 55-58; other organizations working on
standardization are the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE) in 1947 and the OECD in 1960. Id. at 230; its
success in this area is the Agreement concerning the Absorption of
Uniform Conditions of Approval and Reciprocal Recognition of
Approval for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts, and the
International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls
of Goods, which also contains control of compliance with
standards
.
203
. Brian Rothery, ISO 9000, at pp. 2-3 and 7-11 (1993).
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goods and, additionally amended 117 existing standards to
conform with IEC requirements. 204 Also, the US adopted ISO
9000 under a different name, the ANSI/ASQC Q 900-1 series, 205
which operates as a voluntary standards system.
b. International Harmonization of Methodologies
Harmonized international standards are described in
general terms of performance standards, and their
interpretations may vary depending on national legal
theories and practices. Therefore, the differences in
national theories and practices of safety standards cannot
be ignored. Moreover, since national standards are more
flexible than international standards in coping with
changes in technology and consumer expectations, their
existence is important even under a harmonized system of
international standards. Considering the impossibility and
undesirability of making universal international safety
standards and regulations for all products, the practice of
"harmonization based on well -equipped information" was
proposed as second best. 206
204
. GATT, Trade Policy Review: Japan, at p . 92
(1992) [hereinafter, GATT Japan] . Japan approved the use of food
additives that are recognized as scientifically safe by the Codex
standards
.
205
. John T. Rabbitt, ISO 9000: Global Competitor' s Guide to
Compliance and Certification, at p. 41 (1994) . On ANSI, see supra
chapter II , D, 3
.
205
. OECD 1991, at pp. 63-64.
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Harmonization of methodologies in making regulations
and standards can be applied to fill the gap where uniform
regulations are not desirable. In trying to reach an
agreement on methodology, the EC proposed a code of good
practices that can regulate any standard organizations.
This code took the practices of the ISO and the Codex as a
model. However, it was rejected because the majority in the
EC at that time preferred to follow the scheme drafted by
the TBT and ASPM. 207
However, the ISO/IEC cannot guarantee international
harmonization of safety regulations and standards, despite
the existence of the International Information Network
(ISONET) 208 and the Council Committee on Consumer Policy
(COPOLCO)
.
209 Therefore, the Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
in the ISO and the Advisory Committee on Safety (ACOS) in
the IEC, and the International Federation for the
Application of standards (IFAN), were organized in order to
assist in drafting the general guidelines for the
standards. 210
In achieving harmonization of national practices, the
harmonization of classification systems is most important
because differing product -coding systems can become a
207
. GATT, GATT Activities 1989, at p. 122 (1989) [hereinafter,
GATT 1989]; GATT 1990, at p. 121.
208
. The ISONET accumulates information on regulations and
standards of member countries.
209
. The COPOLCO guarantees participation by consumers in the
ISO's process of making standards.
210
. OECD 1991, at pp. 49-50.
72
hindrance when comparing products among countries. 211 For
example, after Canada changed its coding system for certain
products after having used the same classification system
as the US, it became difficult to compare those products
between the two countries. 212
Also, the method of calculating the severity of and
expenses for injuries arising out of the use of the product
must be harmonized among countries in order to provide fair
compensation to the injured consumers. Furthermore, all
relevant information and data must be disclosed for
inspection by an international organization.
2 . Mutual Recognition
The GATT principle of mutual recognition or
equivalency should also apply to the TBT, even though the
TBT does specifically recognize each country's regulations.
This is because some provisions in GATT encourage the
member countries to try to enhance their mutual interest
and the free trade principle. 213 Article 5 of the ASPM also
adopts the equivalency principle, saying that if some
products comply with Country A' s regulations whose
811
. OECD 1987, at p. 11.
212
. Id. at p. 14.
213
. Long, at p. 11; on a related article, see supra Chapter
IV, C, 1.
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objectives and effects are equivalent to those of Country
B's, A and B should recognize each other's regulations. 214
However, the US is likely to oppose the above
interpretation. The US environmentalists have already
argued against the equivalency principle in the ASPM,
declaring that the adoption of the ASPM would undermine the
national sovereignty of the US in regulating the safety of
imported products. 215
The interpretation of key words such as "equivalent,
similar, and identical" is problematic, since these terms
can mean different things to different countries. To
prevent conflicts at least among EC states, the EC
clarifies "mutual recognition" in that "products which are
legally produced or marketed in at least one [EC] member
state are entitled to free circulation throughout the EC
irrespective of their origin." 216 The Non-EC countries could
have mutual recognition agreements with the EC or with each
other, or must pass through the standardization body within
the EC, which is called "a notified body" or "accredited
registrar." 217
214
. ASPM Article 5.
215
. John J. Barcelo III, Product Standards to Protect the
Local Environment, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 755, at pp. 758-760
(1990) .
216
. GATT, Trade Policy Review: European Communities 1991, at
p. 121 (1991) [hereinafter, GATT EC 1991]; the EC prefers this
method to others
.
217
. Id. at p. 125.
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After recognizing the importance of acknowledging
third party certificates, the EC established the EN 45000
series to qualify testing labs and registers. The third
party agencies examine compliance with ISO 9000 and give or
refuse a passing mark. 218
3 . Local Regulations and Specifications 219
The central government of a member state has the duty
of ensuring that its local governments and non-government
bodies comply with Article 2.2 of the TBT. 220 The preemption
theory has been utilized in the US in the pursuit of the
uniformity of risk assessment and risk management. For
example, in the CPSA no state or political subdivision of
the state can make any regulation or retain already made
regulations whenever there are CPSA standards in effect,
unless local regulations are the same as or higher than the
requirements under federal standards. 221 The CPSA sometimes
respects the regulations and standards of the state or
political subdivisions of states if they provide higher
protection for consumers and do not put undue burden on
interstate commerce. In determining whether they are
21B
. Rabbitt, at p. 33 and 35.
219
. The EC is regarded as the central government and other
countries are the local government according to the TBT. See
McGovern, at p. 236.
220
. TBT Article 3.1 and 4-5.
221
. CPSA Section 26 (a), (b) .
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unduly burdensome, data on technical and economic
feasibility are considered. 222
The application of the preemption theory varies among
regulations. For example, in contrast with the above
example of the CPSA, preemption in the FHSA applies only to
labeling, leaving the rest to the control of state laws and
regulations. 223 If regulations of the local government or
non- government body adopt higher standards than those of
the federal government, it is not necessary to notify other
countries. 224 Therefore, higher standards set by the local
governments will make it difficult for foreign industries
to recognize and to follow those standards. 225 For instance,
California has higher standards for automobile emission
control and the cigarette ignition resistance of
upholstery. New York also has tougher regulation standards
for building materials, which require the fire toxicity of
all materials to be inspected. These non-uniform higher
standards are burdensome to exporting countries. 226
222
. CPSA Section 26 (c) .
Scher 1973, at p. 82.
TBT Article 3. 2. OECD 1991, at p . 27
CPSA Section 26 (c)
.
OECD 1991, at p. 27.
223
224
225
226
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4 . Regulations or Standards in and toward Developing
Countries
The idea of special treatment and technical assistance
for developing countries has been deeply rooted in the GATT
system since the Tokyo Round. Article XVIII speaks of
"governmental assistance to economic development," 227 and
Articles XXXVI and XXXVII give special status to developing
countries under the non-reciprocity principle. 228 This
preferential treatment of developing countries is also
embodied in the TBT and the ASPM229 in the form of technical
assistance and technology transfer. 230 However, there are
not yet comprehensive norms in this area, and such
provisions will not be effective without imposing certain
legal duties on the developed countries
.
Moreover, most national safety regulations or
standards do not have special treatment clauses for
developing countries. The developed countries should take
into consideration the developing countries' situations
when making safety regulations and standards. They should
also try to tolerate developing countries' regulations or
standards
.
227
. Long, at pp. 89-94 .
228
. McGovern, at p. 2 73.
229
. On the origin of the special treatment, see McGovern at
pp. 271-272.
23
°. Article 11.2,3, 12.1-3, 7, 8.
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5. Disputes
A violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT resulting in an
"injury" can be brought before the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) of the GATT. 231 A violation of the previously existing
safety regulations, if it also violates Article 2.2 of the
TBT, may also be brought before the DSB. 232
Under the TBT, the individual victims of a safety
regulation violation cannot bring an action against another
government in a domestic court or the DSB of the GATT, 233
while the injured individual companies or other legal
entities in EC Directive may do so. 234 Central governments
as well as local governments can petition, according to
Article XXIII, after consultation and negotiation.
Depending on national legislation, a foreign company may be
allowed to file a petition. The CPSA provides that the
petitions are to be filed in a specified US court of
appeals or to the CPSC. 235
The burden of proof of an Article 2.2 violation is on
the country whose safety regulations are claimed to have
been violated. 236 However, if the regulations or the
231
. GATT XXIII and Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
232
. TBT Article 15 . 2 .
233
. Houtte, at pp. 129-130.
234
. EC Single European Act Article 30-36, 69, 170. Article
170 is for the regional commission's right to petition.
235
. CPSA Section 11(a) and 10.
236
. McGovern, at p. 22 9.
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standards in question are in line with internationally
harmonized standards, the burden of proof will then be
transferred to the country that has allegedly violated the
regulations at issue.
The issues in the disputes mostly arise out of
differences in interpretation of the TBT provisions. Take
one such example. Korean food sanitation regulations have
been attacked by the US since 1990. One issue has been the
shelf life of processed foods. 237 The US representatives
claim 180 days on shelf is safe, while the Korean
representatives claim less than 30 days is safe. This
dispute has been under negotiation before the dispute panel
of the GATT.
237
. GATT 199 0, at p. 121; Korea Herald, MOTIE Min. Park
embarks on U.S. tour for trade talk, February 11, 1995, p. 8
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION
A. Evaluation of the TBT
1. The Evaluation Standard, the New Approach of the EC
The European Community (EC) is more politically and
economically, homogeneous than the TBT or GATT, and its
members are historically and socially more interrelated
with one another than the members of GATT. Because of
similar cultures and common backgrounds, EC organizations
have operated more harmoniously than those of any other
international communities. Although the TBT or GATT cannot
be expected to duplicate the EC experience, we may gain
insights from the EC's systematic approach to risk
assessment and risk management.
The EC's legal provisions are similar to those of
GATT. Each member country has the right to set its own
health and safety regulations or standards. 238 To solve the
problem of varying safety standards and regulations among
the member states, Articles 30 and 36 of the European Union
EU Treaty Article 36.
79
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(EU) Treaty provided that health and safety regulations and
standards should not have the effect of quantitative
restriction, arbitrary discrimination, disguised
restriction, or hindrance, direct or indirect, to intra
-
community trade. 239 Also, according to the Court of Justice,
safety regulations and standards should satisfy the
necessity requirement of human health and safety. 240 This
requirement of necessity has broader meaning than in GATT. 241
The EC has tried three approaches to deal with the
differing safety standards and regulations among member
countries. 242 The first approach is called the "New
Approach." 243 Under the New Approach, the Council Directives
prescribe essential requirements which are then
supplemented by the national product safety agencies'
voluntary standards. The second approach is the traditional
approach, in which the Council Directive itself provides
detailed standards for harmonization. The EC at first used
the traditional approach to all products, until the Court
of Justice in Cassiss de Dijon case strongly endorsed
national sovereignty based on the principle of safety
legitimacy. Consequently, the EC adopted the New Approach
in the EEC Council Resolution on Technical Harmonization of
239
. Houtte, at p. 132, note 17.
Id. note 19.
Jackson, at p. 414.
OECD 1991, at pp. 40-42.
The New Approach was named for the EEC Council Resolution
on the Technical Harmonization of Standards in 1985. See id. at p.
40.
240
241
242
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Standards in 1985. 244 The third approach takes national
standards and regulations as the primary text for product
standards, and the EC is simply notified of these as the
reference for the other member countries. 245
2 . The Characteristics of the New Approach
The New Approach is a systematic start to solving the
problem of different safety regulations and standards among
countries. Above all, the recent General Product Safety
Directive is a comprehensive and relatively detailed
program246 that can be a guide to the revised TBT.
Therefore, a look at the characteristics of the New
Approach may be helpful
.
The New Approach is initiated only when national
product safety requirements conflict with those of other
member countries and impede free trade. 247 If a product
coming into the EC is classified as a "regulated product,"
related to health, safety, and environmental protection, it
should meet the European standard, the EN 29000 standard,
which is a voluntary standard identical to the ISO 9000
244
. Id. at p. 40.
245
. GATT, Trade Policy Review: European Communities vol. 1,
at p. 121 (1991) [hereinafter, GATT EC 1991] .
246
.
Directive 92/59/EEC, 29/6/92, OJ No L 228, 11/9/92, pp.
24-32; Margaret L. Moses, Europe's New Product Safety Rule, 132
N.J. L.J. 1191, at p. 11 and 29 (Dec. 28, 1992).
247
. GATT EC 1991, at p. 122.
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standard. 248 Therefore, exporters who plan to market their
products in the EC should get a certification of EN 29000
standard compliance in advance.
The following private organizations set the EN
standards: the CEN for non-electrical product standards,
the CENELEC for electrical product standards, and the ETSI
for telecommunication standards. These standards are
derived from the details of the Directives on the product
safety, and they have already been approved by the EC. 249
Since the New Approach is to become effective in the
future, the Council Directives of 1991 have not yet gone
into effect, even though they have already been approved. 250
Therefore, the detailed standards under the traditional
approach are still in force as long as the Directives
following the traditional approach are effective.
As long as the EC has set harmonized standards for a
product, national regulations of a member state on that
product cannot take effect, unless that member state
notifies the Commission of its plan to make the regulation
in advance. The Commission then decides whether a member
state needs to have separate health and safety regulations
different from the harmonized EC standards and whether
248
. Rabbitt, at p. 36; children's toys, the computer
terminals and food Packaging are examples. Rabbitt, at pp. 31-33;
one hot issue is software for operating systems because, if it has
a defect, it may cause the human injury or death during operation.
249
.
GATT EC 1991, at p. 123.
250
. Id.
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those standards are reasonable. However, even the
regulations endorsed by the Commission may be subject to
annulment by the Court of Justice. 251
Furthermore, any private individual can challenge, in
a national court, a national regulation or standard of a
member country which violates EU Treaty Articles 30-36. The
national court then requests the Court of Justice to make a
preliminary ruling on whether the regulation at issue
violates the Treaty and the Directives. The national court
then predicates its own decision on the decision of the
Court of Justice. The EC Commission and member countries
can also request the Court of Justice to declare a member
state's national regulation a violation of the Treaty. 252
Finally, it should also be noted that a defendent
whose products are certified under the ISO standard or the
EC standard has an advantage in defending a product
liability lawsuit because his products are presumed to have
been produced under a defect- free production process and
are therefore safe. 253
251
. EU Treaty Article 100A , 100B, and 100
252
. EU Treaty Article 169 and 170.
253 Rabbitt, at pp. 35-3 6.
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3 . The TBT in Terms of the General Product Safety
Directive254
As in the EC's General Product Safety Directive, the
>
TBT should contain more details on risk assessment and risk
management, such as the harmonized methodologies infra 25S
and clear definitions of general terms. 256 For example,
while the TBT does not provide a definition of safety, the
EC Directive has full definitions which are helpful in
hazard identification and risk characterization. 257 The EC
Directive also clearly defines the producer and
distributors, 258 which reduces the conflicts surrounding the
interpretation of those words. Further, the TBT should
clearly enumerate such considerations as characteristics of
products, technical feasibility, and so on that are
necessary in risk assessment. 259
Risk assessment and risk management in the EC are
triggered by a violation by manufacturers of either a
general duty or a specific duty. A general duty is the
duty of due care, and a specific duty may be the duty to
supply safe products, the duty to provide all necessary
254
. After a two-year transition period, this Directive became
effective on June 29, 1994 [hereinafter, Directive]
.
255
. Of course, because the Directive is part of the New
Approach plan, the features of the New Approach are true of this
Directive
.
256
. Directive Article 2.
257
.
Directive Article 2 (b) .
258
.
Directive Article 2 (d) , (e) .
259
. Id.
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information, or the duty to take all possible measures. 260
Each EC member state is responsible for adopting and
implementing suitable measures for risk management within
that state, and for setting up competent safety agencies
for rule making and adjudication. It is internationally
important that these domestic duties ensure exportation of
safe products. 261
The TBT should also guarantee the protection of
information filed with the TBT Committee and safety
agencies because disclosure of information can be an
unnecessary trade obstacle, as explained earlier. Also,
the TBT should describe available measures for risk
management. While allowing the member countries to take
appropriate measures, the EC Directive describes what is
appropriate in the following specific measures: the
competent monitoring system, the request for all necessary
information, the inspection of samples or production
processes, the efficient warning system, risk communication
for all possible persons, sale permission after the
absolute safety check, recall and destruction, and
emergency standards. 262 Although these measures may differ
among countries, the conditions and effects of as many
measures or groups of measures as possible need to be
harmonized to avert conflicts.
260
_
Directive Article 3.
261
. Directive Article 5.
262
. Directive Article 6.
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The relationship between harmonized standards and
national standards should be clearly described in order to
facilitate mutual recognition. In the EC Directive, if
there is no EC regulation, national regulations or
standards are to be complied with. If there are no
national mandatory or voluntary standards, the EC standards
or the standards of other member countries may be used for
recognition of a safe product. The EC Directive also
recognizes standards of a non-member country if they are
acknowledged by a member country. 263
4 . The TBT in terms of National Practices
The Code of Practice of the TBT should include general
principles regarding the collection methods and the kind of
data required for hazard identification. The decision on
the necessity and priority of risk management plays an
important part in product safety and must be predicated on
hazard identification and whether product safety agencies
have regulated the safety of a product. In reality,
however, even developed countries like the US and several
OECD countries have often decided to regulate products only
263
.
Directive Article 4
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on the basis of such meager information as a medical
report . 264
Uniform product classifications should be established
in the TBT to enable the TBT Committee to compare the risk
assessment and risk management of member countries.
Differences in product classification systems have been an
obstacle in judging whether the risk assessment and risk
management of a country are an unnecessary trade barrier
compared with those of other countries. 265 The need for a
uniform classification system is analogous to the need for
a uniform tariff schedule.
The data on risk assessment and risk management should
be described in a consistent manner in order for the
Committee to understand them. 266 The data should be
described in a mathematical, statistical statement as much
as possible, since a mathematical, statistical statement
can help clarify the cost and probability of accidents and
the severity of injuries. 267 Relative numbers instead of
absolute numbers, e.g., ratio, weight, and rank, should be
employed because absolute numbers will always differ among
countries and mean different things. For example,
264
. OECD 1987, at pp. 12-14; the OECD once recommended a
uniform system with identifiable groups of injuries and priorities
among them as the minimum element in the Report on Data Collecting
System in 1978. However, this recommendation is not yet achieved
by member countries.
265
. Id. at p. 11.
266
. This new approach has been worked out in OECD. See id. at
p. 12 .
267
. Id. at p. 13 .
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compensation for the loss of a human life is different in
each country depending on the economic and political
situation as well as the society's view on the worth of a
human life. The US legal system is peculiar in its
practice of awarding punitive damages, though it is similar
to European civil law countries in other aspects like
compensation of hospital expense and loss of income.
However, because priorities among conflicting values, the
probability and severity of injuries, and relative values
are very similar among countries, the data on risk
assessment should be described in relative numbers in order
to compare practices more accurately.
B. Evaluation of the US Product Safety Regulation and
Standard Systems
1. General Criticism of US Practices 268
The product safety laws and regulations in the US lack
coherence in comparison to the systematic organization in
the EC's New Approach. The same key words in different
statutes have different meanings, and value judgments are
often inconsistent depending on the responsible agencies
and organizations and the time of the decision. For
266
. Bureau of National Affairs, Safety and Liability
Reporter, at p. 175 (1995) [hereinafter, BNA 1995] .
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example, OSHA's interpretation of the key term
"unreasonable risk" is more sympathetic toward the industry
than the CPSA's interpretation of the same term. 269
The US imposes adjudication measures for simple
procedural violations more frequently than the EC. 270 For
instance, the CPSC often heavily penalizes manufacturers
who fail to comply with procedural provisions that are
irrelevant to the general duty of product safety required
by the CPSA. It may deny importation of certain products
for not having kept appropriate records, or for failing to
file a proper notification.
Further, a skeptical attitude toward technology and
scientific discovery in the judicial and administrative
bodies discourages a foreign company with state-of-art
technology from entering the US market. They often confer
unreasonably strict liability decisions on the new
technology without giving it due credit. This attitude is
clearly evidenced in product liability cases where
astronomical amounts of punitive damages are often imposed
on the producers of products whose safety has not yet been
proven. 271
269
. Id. at p. 180.
270
. Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hud and Peter Shears,
Product Safety in the United States and the European Communi ties:
A Comparative Approach, 17 Md J. Int'l Law & Trade 177, at pp. 8-9
(1993) .
271
. Murray Mackay, Liability, Safety, and Innovation in the
Automotive Industry in Peer W. Huber and Robert E. Li tan eds
.
Liability Maze, at p. 210 (1991); on court system, see Id. at pp.
200-202. /Another example is the adjustable seat belt anchorage in
the 1980s. European companies worried about possible suits based
90
For these reasons, some new technologies that have
huge advantages in fiercely competitive markets like Japan
or the EC are not introduced in the US until later. A
radar- controlled proximity braking system, for example, has
not been introduced in cars heading for the US because
European and Japanese manufacturers worried about possible
liability suits for design defects and about NHTSA
adjudications. In a case involving one such advanced
technology, the Audi automobile company was sued for the
safety of Audi 5000 's unintended acceleration system.
Although this new technology had no technical problems in
the NHTSA report, the relentless blast by the media and
massive litigations by consumers, both of which are salient
cultural features in the US, caused serious financial
trouble for Audi. 272
2. Criticism on Risk Management in the US: Centering on
Decision Making
The US system also has a few risk-management
problems. 273 First of all, there are few specialists and
engineers participating in risk assessment and risk
on the defective design, inadequate warnings, lack of possibly
astronomical punitive damage awards; see Id. at p. 214. On the
child seat belt, see id. at p. 217. Even though the imported
product follows safety regulations and standards, the court does
not guarantee the winning of the suit. That is, no preemption is
applied to the adoption of the safety feature.
272
. Id. at pp. 210-211.
273
. Cheit, at pp. 203-205 and 207.
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management. Most participants are lawyers with little
technical knowledge or comprehension of the subject matter.
As a result, many provisions of the regulations
unnecessarily emphasize meticulous procedural issues
.
In addition, public regulations are not usually
revised in accordance with a change of situation. 274 Even
when the current technology reveals a safety problem in a
certain product, or when new tests show conflicting
results, necessary changes in the safety measures are often
delayed by the saturated bureaucracy and complicated
procedures . 275
Furthermore, the US takes account of only its own
technical level. For instance, the NHTSA established the
standards for automobile crashworthiness, 276 FMVSS 100s and
200s, reflecting US manufacturing practices. 277 In drafting
the recent FMVSS 214 standard, the side-impact standard,
they again considered only whether that standard was
technologically and economically feasible in the US and
ignored any international feasibility. 278
As for the CPSC, three important weaknesses are
apparent in regards to acceptable risk and appropriate
274
. Id. at pp. 203-204 .
275
. Id. at pp. 2 04 .
276
. The NHTSA has been operating since 196 8.
277
. These standards technologically require manufacturers to
enhance their ability. They influence those who target the US car
market such as EC and Japan. These standards have so changed the
concepts of manufacturers that passing the test of those standards
has become one of most primary goals
.
278
. Mackay, at pp. 202-206.
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measures. First, its regulation uses very general and broad
terms, raising the possibility of arbitrary-
interpretations. Second, it often insufficiently considers
the trade-off between the cost and the benefit of complying
with the regulations. Third, it concentrates too little on
the rule making process and too much on aspects of the
adjudication process such as the ban and the recall,
perhaps in an attempt to elude attacks from the court on
the formal rule making procedure. 279 In the matchbook
standard, for instance, the CPSC failed to establish the
necessity of regulation. It did not adequately analyze the
accident generation process, accident patterns or accident
statistics; it failed to consider available measures and
alternatives and to compare exact costs and benefits. 280 In
another case involving a gas- fired space heater, the CPSC
made the false assumption that a price increase of five
percent would not affect consumer demand, and randomly
calculated possible reduction in injury without exact
data. 281
279
. Viscusi, at p. ix-x.
280
. Mackay, at p. 92; in making the matchbook standard, the
CPSC did not pay attention to other elements capable of lighting a
fire
.
281
. Id. at p. 98.
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3 . Criticism of US Practices of Making Standards
The US private standard makers have been criticized
for being too heavily influenced by industry groups and not
ensuring participation by all interest groups. This
criticism may not be entirely correct but has some merit
.
For example, when the UL issued safety standards for the
solid-fuel-type room heater, it consulted with the stove
manufacturers and trade associations but not consumer
groups. The UL 1482 standard, the codification of the
generally accepted business practices among relevant
industries at that time, received support from the
industry. 282 Only afterwards did the UL pursue a canvass
process for the obvious purpose of gaining consensus of the
Board of Standards Review under the ANSI and elicit
comments from parties interested in developing woodstove
standards. 283 When standard makers rely too heavily on
industry groups, they tend to base their decisions on shaky
theories or information supplied by the manufacturers, who
have an obvious interest in one direction or another. The
performance clauses of US 1482, for example, are criticized
for being founded not on scientific theories but rather on
guesswork, despite the claim that it was based on "sound
282
. On this example, see Cheit, at pp. 94-102.
283
. ANSI does not have a technical staff and information
collection system. It relies on the voluntary cooperation of
standard writers. See Cheit at p. 98.
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engineering principles, research, records of tests and
field experience . . . and information obtained from
manufacturers, users and others having special experience
including educated guesses and concessions to the
praticalities of product testing." 284
284
.
Cheit, at pp. 102-104; the specific example of such
guesswork is the temperature of the exposed surface.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Since the TBT is applicable to all GATT member states,
it will often be used in deciding whether certain national
safety regulations or standards are unnecessarily trade-
restrictive. It is doubtful, however, that Article 2.2 will
be very helpful because it allows very broad discretion of
individual countries over the methodology of risk
assessment and risk management. The TBT should be amended
to include exclusive provisions on product safety because
the Code of Good Practice in the Annex of the TBT provides
meager guidance. Detailed agreements as to the definitions
of certain terms like general duty, availability of safety
measures, and methodologies of safety regulations, etc.,
are necessary. The new provisions should focus on
methodological issues because the harmonization of
methodologies, along with the mutual recognition of
methodologies, is one of the best ways to resolve conflicts
arising out of different safety regimes.
Harmonization of product classification systems in
each country is the most important element in this
endeavor. Harmonized classification systems will make it
95
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easier to compare and evaluate national safety regulations
under Article 2.2, and therefore the TBT Committee's
harmonization efforts should start with classification
systems
.
Also, rules of participation in the decision-making
process should be established in detail. Especially, the
TBT should ensure that consumers are allowed to participate
in the process of determining regulations and standards.
Consumers choose products to maximize their satisfaction
and are well aware of acceptable risks. Moreover, since
their tastes and needs are becoming more internationally
homogeneous and product information is more readily
available than ever, their views on product safety are
assimilated enough to create similar safety standards for
the product. Open communication regarding product risks
should also be encouraged between consumers and the product
risk sources. Furthermore, foreign industry representatives
should also participate in making national safety
regulations and standards. They should participate before
the standardization decisions are made.
The US risk assessment and risk management system
should make certain changes. Instead of using
manufacturers ' s current manufacturing practices as their
yardstick, the regulatory agencies and private standard
makers should utilize more input by other interested groups
than the manufacturers. Current use of adjudication should
97
be more coherent throughout the various safety agencies and
legal sources.
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